Wireless sensor networks are widely used in our daily life. It consists of various sensors which collect different information containing the identity, status, and location of an object or any other business, social or privately relevant information. But we pay attention to some issues related to sensor's location privacy. In this paper, we focus on protecting the sensor's location by introducing suitable modifications to sensor routing to make it difficult for an eavesdropper to find the original location. And we propose a Multi-source and Multi-routing scheme, which is a flexible routing strategy to protect the sensor's location. Our strategy can efficiently reduce the chance of packets being detected. And the adversary can find it difficult to find the exact location of the source node or the base station.
Introduction
Wireless sensor networks have gained more popularity in recent years. In wireless sensor networks, sensors are deployed in various kinds of applications to monitor events and transmit information to base station. In battlefield, sensors are deployed to monitor enemy's activity and send messages to base station. And sensors can also be deployed to monitor the environment and temperature in civilian applications or monitor animals in natural habitats.
if an adversary cannot obtain the information contained in the payloads, he can still retrieve other sensitive information by observing and analyzing the communications [2] . For example, an attacker can obtain the information from the network and the environment being monitored by simple observation of the network traffic [3] . Besides, an attacker can compromise users' location privacy by observing the wireless signals from user devices [4, 5] .
Although many existing privacy techniques can be employed in sensor network scenarios, they cannot effectively preserve the sensor location in a sensor network [6, 7] . The reason is that the problems are different in fact and many of the methods introduce overhead which is too burdensome for sensor networks. And many techniques do not consider the capacity, computing power and power of sensors, which are the limiting factors in wireless sensor networks. And some techniques analyze privacy and anonymity issues and propose solutions by manipulating the message contents [8, 9] . In contrast to their schemes, this paper addresses the location privacy threat due to the physical wireless medium that allows the adversary to perform traffic analysis to derive the message flows.
In this paper, we propose a multi-source and multi-routing method to preserve sensor location information in wireless sensor networks. The multi-source includes several fake source nodes which send packets to the base station in the same way as the real source nodes. The multirouting consists of a given number of random paths which are initiated with a given number of hops in wireless sensor networks. Sensors that are located on these random paths will serve as the receptors. And we set an interference area around the sink to confuse the adversary. So our scheme can efficiently protect the location privacy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Related work and previously proposed techniques for location privacy are presented in Section 2. After that, Section 3 discusses the system model. Then we present our Multi-source and Multi-routing scheme and discuss the privacy analysis in Section 4. And in Section 5 we provide simulations results of our scheme and discuss these results. Finally, Section 6 reports some concluding remarks and highlights future works in the field.
Related Work
In wireless sensor networks, it is important to provide confidentiality to the sensor's location. In this section, we describe previous proposed technologies that were designed to protect the objects.
Panda-Hunter Game is proposed in [10] , which is an application scenario of a wireless sensor network for monitoring a panda. In this game, a large number of panda-detection sensors are deployed in a panda habitat. When sensors have observed a panda, they will generate event messages and send them to the base station. Meanwhile, a panda-hunter tries to capture the panda by back-tracing the routing path until it reaches the source. Therefore, a secure routing scheme should prevent the hunter from locating the source, while transmitting the data to the base station.
For the location information, Random walk can efficiently protect sensor's location privacy. A message is randomly forwarded from source, while it does not expose any information about the source. Actually, an adversary cannot know which random path is the accurate direction. So he cannot find the location of source and possibly reach an unknown sensor. But a pure random walk scheme is not secure for preserving private information of the location [6] . In addition, it can be shown that a pure random walk tends to stay around the real source [11] .
Phantom Routing is proposed in [6] , which is one of random walk approaches. The phantom routing is used to transmit information from the location of the panda to the sink for preserving its location privacy. Firstly, a message is randomly forwarded a few steps from data source. And then, the message is being delivered through flooding or single path routing to base station.
In order to prevent eavesdropper from gaining the location of a source, Greedy Random Walk scenario is proposed in [1] . Each packet is transmitted to the base station following the preestablished path. However, it cannot defeat the global adversary's traffic analysis and trace to the source or the base station. In our scheme, it can efficiently prevent a global eavesdropper from finding the location information of source or base station and threatening the safety of sensors.
In order to prevent traffic analysis attacks, some techniques have been proposed to protect the location of the base station. A relative fixed path scheme is proposed in [12] . The source nodes send information to a single base station in relatively fixed paths. Although the scheme can balance the traffic load of the network, it cannot defend a global adversary attack. In our scheme, we can effectively protect the location of the base station against a global adversary.
System Model

Network Model
Sensor networks consist of a number of different types of sensor nodes that have been deployed to monitor environment or collect data and send information to the sink in an area. In sensor networks, every sensor sends data to its neighboring nodes within its radio range.
In this paper, we assume that sensor nodes are evenly deployed in the sensor network and do not move after being deployed. All of sensors have roughly the same capabilities, power sources and expected lifetimes. When a sensor node monitors an object, the node will send a message to a base station. And a message is forwarded through certain routing strategies adopted the sensor networks. Moreover, we assume that a base station is deployed in the network and collects event data with greater computational capabilities.
Adversary Model
For various kinds of wireless sensor networks, we assume that an adversary is a motivated and funded attacker whose objective is to learn sensitive location-based information. The adversary has unbounded energy resource, adequate computation capability and sufficient memory for data storage. And the adversary can observe and eavesdrop on the information in a limited range. Although the adversary can eavesdrop on the message between nearby sensor nodes to backtrace to a parent node, the adversary cannot determine the content of the message that is encrypted by secret keys.
Similar to [13] , we assume that the adversary stays nearby the base station or the sink, where it is guaranteed that a large number of packets will arrive eventually. The adversary is constantly monitoring and eavesdropping. When the eavesdropper monitors a message, he knows which node among the neighborhood sent that message and will move to the transmitting node. If the eavesdropper does not monitor any message for a certain time, he will stay or go back one step and keep monitoring. The adversary repeats this process until he reaches the source. Then the adversary can know the location information of source node. Besides, the adversary can monitor the different transmission rates between the nodes and select the correct backtracking routing. And the eavesdropper may observe the correlation in transmission times between a node and its neighbor, attempting to deduce a routing path.
Multi-source and Multi-routing Scheme
In this section, we propose a scheme for preserving location privacy. We assume that the contents of all transmitted data packets are encrypted by secret keys so that the adversary cannot gain the content of transmitted packets and find the location of sensors. Many key pre-distribution protocols can be used for our purpose [14, 15] . So the adversary cannot use the content to trace the object. The scheme can successfully make adversaries stay away from the base station or the source node. Besides, the method can effectively make trade-offs between privacy, communication cost and latency.
Protocol Description
In order to preserve information of location privacy, we propose a Multi-source and Multi-routing scheme (MSMR) to address this problem. After the sensor network is deployed, every node has an initial table which records its all neighbors' ID. Then, we randomly choose m fake source nodes which send fake packets in the same way as the real source nodes. And the base station broadcasts special information to its neighbors which are marked by a special sign. So several marked nodes around the base station compose a special area, called interference area. Besides, we initiate random paths which consist of a given number (j ) of hops in wireless sensor network. Firstly, we randomly choose q sensors, called initial nodes. After the initial node i randomly selects next hop from its neighbors, it sends an initial message msg(i) to next node (1 ≤ i ≤ q). And the initial node i has its own path mark. After j hops, they generate q initial random paths. And each initial path don't intersect with other initial paths. Sensors which are located on each random path will serve as the receptors. And sensors in the same path can transmit a data by a pre-established direction. Then a packet is randomly forwarded from a source until it reaches a receptor. At that point, the packet is forwarded through the pre-established path and reaches the end of this path. And then the packet is randomly forwarded again until it reaches the interference area. Meanwhile, when a node in the interference area receives a packet, it will broadcast the packet and a special sign to its neighbors which include the base station. But when a node in the interference area receives a fake packet, it will filter the fake packet. Fig. 1 illustrates the basic idea of Multi-source and Multi-routing scheme.
However, it is possible that a packet may forward to one of its previous hop's neighbors or pre-established paths. So such that forwarding scheme is not good since the random walk does not make much progress. To solve this problem, the sensor nodes have their filter queue and store the forwarding packet information in the filter. And the size of the filter at sensor nodes is z. When a sensor randomly chooses next hop from its neighbors, it should check whether the neighbor has been already in the filter. If the neighbor isn't in the filter, the sensor will broadcast the next node's ID to other sensor nodes. Then other nodes store the next sensor's ID in the filter. For the full filter queues, if a new node's ID is not in a full filter queue, the filter queue will delete the head information in the filter queue and store the new node's ID at the end of the filter. So it is effective to prevent the storage from being exhausted. Meanwhile, if all neighbors of one node are in its filter, the node will randomly choose next hop from its neighbors but not broadcast the neighbor's ID to other nodes. This can continue to transmit the packets and prevent unintentional loss of data.
Algorithm 1 shows a packet will be forwarded to base station by Multi-source and Multi-routing method. The real packets and the fake packets are sent from the real source and the fake source that randomly choose their neighbors as the next hop. Then the packets are sent to the next node. If a packet is not in the filter, the filter will store the information of the packet in this node. If the next node includes a pre-established path, the packet will follow this path and the filter will record the information about the packet in this path. Every node follows the rule to send the packet until it reaches the interference area. And then, a node in interference area receives a real packet and broadcast the real packet to its neighbors with a special sign. But if a node in interference area receives a dummy packet, it will filter the dummy packet.
Note that it is efficient to preserve the sensor location privacy in our scheme. On the one hand, the packet is randomly forwarded so that it is difficult to detect a packet by an eavesdropper. Even though an eavesdropper happens to detect a packet, the next packet is unlikely to follow the same path, thus rendering the previous observation useless. On the other hand, when a packet is transmitted in the interference area, an adversary cannot distinguish the correct direction or the incorrect one. For a global adversary, he cannot distinguish the real source from the fake source even if he can perform traffic analysis. And in the interference area the adversary cannot find the exact location information of the base station.
Traceback Time Analysis
In order to preserve location privacy, we firstly analyze the adversary traceback time. If we can increase the traceback time, we can efficiently protect the location information and the adversary may spend lots of time to choose the correct routing.
For our routing scheme, we consider that N nodes are deployed in wireless sensor network. For each node i, let F i be the frequency of transmitted packets seen at node i. And we assume that L is the length of average routing path between the source node and the base station. So the adversary can catch the next packet in 
We note that when F i is small enough, the adversary can spend more time tracing the packet.
In our scheme we note that sensor nodes can randomly choose their neighbors to transmit a packet to the base station. So this can generate n paths as a set K R = {k 1 , k 2 , · · · , k n } by the real source node in our routing scenario. So fake source nodes can also generate m · n paths as a set
And the length of each path is the number of hops between the source node and the base station. Let E be the amount of energy required to transmit a packet from the source node to the base station. Then we define the length of each path
Similarly, we define the length of each path
And we assume that each source node i can randomly choose each path k i,j with probability
Once the adversary starts tracing on one routing path in set K, he will not be able to monitor the packet on the other path. When the adversary eavesdrops the packet on path k i,j , the traceback time is
. We will get the traceback time
We note that when all of the flows are distributed to k 1 and all other paths have the maximum length, the average traceback time is maximized.
Privacy Analysis
In order to research the problem of preserving sensor location privacy in wireless sensor networks, we propose the Multi-source and Multi-routing scheme to prevent an adversary from finding a source node or the base station. In this section, we describe a model for analyzing the location privacy in sensor networks. In this model, the eavesdropper deploys a snooping network to monitor the sensor activities in the whole network. We assume that an adversary can monitor the traffic and backtrace to a parent node. But the adversary cannot gain the contents of any data packet which are encrypted with secret keys. And we note that if the probability which the adversary finds the source node or base station successfully is low, the location privacy is high in the sensor networks. And we can defend the location privacy against the adversary to traceback in our scheme.
In the following, we assume that the adversary wants to gain the location information of the source by snooping and backtracing in the sensor network. As long as the eavesdropper knows the routing protocol, he is able to predict the source location within a reasonable period of time. Obviously, the defender has to confuse the adversary to make a wrong decision and move away from real source node or the base station.
The adversary stays nearby the base station or the sink, where it is guaranteed that a large number of packets will arrive eventually. The adversary is constantly monitoring and eavesdropping. When the adversary monitors a message, he will make a decision to choose the direction. Sensor nodes randomly transmit a packet to their neighbors so that the adversary cannot distinguish the correct choice from the false one and must guess. We define that each node has h neighbors around itself. Let S be the set of all nodes in the sensor network. For each node s i ∈ S, s i should choose its neighbors to transmit a packet. Therefore, the probability of an adversary selecting the correct direction is
We define that P is the probability of a pre-established path. And let P i be the probability of a node being the ith node in a pre-established path. Thus, for the adversary, he makes a right decision to select a pre-established path and the probability P of the pre-established path is P 1 + P 2 + P 3 + · · · , where P i is the probability of the node being the i th node.
As we know, each node has h neighbors. We define that the end node of a pre-established path is an active node. We assume that node A and node B are neighbors in sensor networks. We define that p is the probability P A of A being an active node. If the node A selects the node B as a second node in the pre-established path, the probability P AB is p × 1 h . And each other neighbors of h neighbors of the node B are the active nodes, which can also select as a second node in the pre-established path. So if the node B is not an active node but is the second node in a pre-established path, the probability P B is
Therefore, for the third node in a pre-established path, we know that the probability P 3 is p × (1 − p) 2 . We assume that the average length of a pre-established in the sensor network is l and the probability P of a pre-established path is
According to the analysis above, we assume that the whole path contains r pre-established paths. Then the rest of paths contains (r + 1) parts and the average length of each part is l R . Besides, there are m fake source nodes in our scheme. Each fake source transmits dummy packets with the same way as the real source. So the probability an adversary selecting the correct direction to the real source node is Fig. 2 shows the relationship between the probability p and P S . Fig. 2 (a) shows that when the probability of the adversary selecting correct pre-established paths is high, the probability of the adversary finding the source node is high. But the location privacy is low. And we can see that as the number of fake source nodes increases, increasing the probability p require the less probability P S . In other words, increasing fake source nodes can confuse the adversary to traceback. In Fig. 2 (b) , when r increases, the probability of finding the real source node is very low. And we should make trade-offs between the number of fake source nodes and the location privacy.
For the base station, preserving location privacy is the same important as the source node. All packets must be transmitted to the base station. So there are high overhead around the base station. In our scheme, in order to preserve the location privacy of the base station, we set a interference area to confuse the adversary to make a wrong decision and move away from the base station. In the interference area, the adversary cannot distinguish between the location of the real base station and the wrong location. When a real packet is transmitted to the interference area, the node in the interference area must broadcast to its neighbors. And if a dummy packet is send to the interference area, the node in the area will filter the dummy packet. This can efficiently confuse the adversary.
Evaluation
In this section, we use simulations to compare the performance of Random Walk and GROW with our method Multi-source and Multi-routing in terms of latency and communication cost. Our method can effectively preserve the location privacy of source nodes and the base station and decrease the communication overhead.
The simulation is based on TOSSIM [16] . In the simulation, we deploy 1,600 sensor nodes in a square area of 100 × 100 meters. For each sensor node, the transmission range is 2.5 meters. And an object moves in the senor network and generates real event messages. Meanwhile, the sensor nodes collect and transmit the information to the base station. There are two fake source nodes in our simulation. Then we initiate several random paths which consist of a given number of hops in wireless sensor network. And sensors in the same path can transmit a data by a pre-established direction. And there is an interference area around the base station. Fig. 3 (a) shows the impact of different number of message packets to the average latency in three methods. We set the maximum latency 150 seconds. The sensors randomly choose the next hop so that we select the average latency. For Random Walk, the packets tend to stay around the source node so that the packets are not transmitted to the base station in the maximum latency. For MSMR and GROW, the average latency of MSMR increases much slower compared to the GROW scheme. And the packets can be quickly sent to the base station.
From Fig. 3 (b) , we can see that the average communication cost increases when the packets increase. We set the maximum communication cost 15000. For Random Walk scheme, the packets waste a large number of communication cost. However, the communication cost of MSMR increases much slower compared to the GROW scheme. When the packets increase, the overhead obviously decreases in our method. For the number of fake source nodes, there is a trade-off between privacy, latency and communication cost. For different applications, we can set the suitable number of fake source nodes in the sensor network. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we focus on the location privacy problem in sensor network. We propose Multisource and Multi-routing scheme to prevent an global adversary from analyzing the traffic to find the source or the base station. Our simulation results show that MSMR can efficiently hamper the adversary's analysis progress. And it can efficiently protect the location information of source and sink.
Wireless sensor networks are widely deployed to collect valuable information in various kinds of applications. However, it is obvious that preserving private location information is a big challenge in sensor network. And an eavesdropper may be able to find location information by monitoring and analyzing message routing paths, which can be a serious privacy issue. In this paper, we propose Multi-source and Multi-routing scheme to prevent an adversary from backtracing message routing paths to the event source or analyzing the transmitted paths to find the base station, which can enhance the privacy protection. And it can efficiently protect the location information of the source nodes and the base station. Our future work is to further study wireless sensor networks and efficiently protect location privacy.
